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INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND 
CHINA’S MANAGEMENT OF ITS  
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 
JAMES D. FRY* 
AGNES CHONG** 
Abstract: This Article explores China’s management of its international riv-
ers. China has various domestic pieces of legislation, including the Water Law 
of 2002, to regulate the uses and protection of its international rivers. It is 
clear that international water law influenced China inasmuch as there are simi-
larities between the 1997 Watercourses Convention and the Water Law of 
2002, and even China has recognized the influence of international law in the 
formation of its Water Law of 2002. This runs contrary to the widespread be-
lief among Western commentators that China generally does not engage in 
these types of matters with international water law in mind. As evidence, these 
commentators point to China’s objection to signing the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention and its refusal to join any river-basin commissions for any of its 
international rivers. This Article, however, shows how China has been strong-
ly influenced by the international water-law regime and has engaged with oth-
er states in the management of its international rivers, albeit with a limited 
number of states. This Article posits that China can further benefit from en-
gaging in international fora when trying to manage its domestic water issues.  
INTRODUCTION 
 China has within its borders the most international rivers and lakes in the 
world,1 and it lies within a staggering nineteen international water basins.2 
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 1 See Simon Marsden, Developing Approaches by Trans-Boundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment in China: Cooperation Through the Greater Tumen Initiative and in the Pearl River 
Delta Region, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 393, 393–94 (2010). 
 2 See James E. Nickum, The Upstream Superpower: China’s International Rivers, in MAN-
AGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS AND LAKES 237, 237 (Olli Varis et al. eds., 2008). Inter-
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With approximately 110 international lakes and rivers, China benefits from a 
rich supply of transboundary resources, which mainly are located in the 
northeastern, northwestern, and southwestern regions of China.3 The interna-
tional rivers in the northeastern region are primarily contiguous watercours-
es—being border rivers that form boundaries between states—whereas the 
international rivers in the northwestern and southwestern regions are succes-
sive watercourses—being rivers that flow through more than one riparian 
state. 4  These successive watercourses, starting from the northwest to the 
southwest, include the Har Us Nur River, Irtysh River, Ob River, Ili River, 
Tarim River, Indus River, Aral Sea, Yalung Zangbo-Brahmaputra River, Irra-
waddy River, Lujiang-Salween River, Lancang-Mekong River, Beilun River, 
Hsi River, and Yuanjiang-Red River.5 To the northeast, there are the Heilong-
                                                                                                                           
national water basins or international watercourses may be either contiguous (meaning forming a 
boundary) or successive (meaning crossing boundaries). Article 2(b) of the 1997 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Water-
courses Convention) defines an international water basin as “a watercourse, parts of which are 
situated in different States.” Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses art. 2(b), May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Watercourses Con-
vention]. Therefore, the coverage of these definitions concerns not only the main stream of a river 
and streams that form or cross international boundaries, but also surface water systems and 
groundwater channels, as well as tributaries and lakes that connect to international watercourses. 
See ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION USER’S GUIDE 75 (2012). 
The physical attributes of an international water basin mean that it is shared between the states 
through which the watercourse runs. Hence, “the definition calls the attention of States to the 
interrelationship between all parts of the [international watercourse].” See Stephen McCaffrey, 
The Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 251 (2001). Activity on one part of the water-
course in one state affecting the use and protection of the same watercourse in another state re-
quires enforcement of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization in relation to the shared 
watercourse to ensure a balanced and equitable use of the watercourse. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Merits, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Sept. 25).  
 3 He Daming et al., Research Progress of International Rivers in China, 14 J. GEOGRAPHIC 
SCI. 21, 21–22 (2004). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See Nickum, supra note 2, at 237; He et al., supra note 3, at 272; Aaron T. Wolf et al., In-
ternational River Basins of the World, 15 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 387, 399–403 (1999); 
Transboundary Water Management Database, INT’L CTR. FOR WATER COOPERATION, www.
internationalwatercooperation.org/tbwaters/ [https://perma.cc/ZUF9-MX53] (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016) (listing the following successive rivers as shared with the countries indicated in parentheses: 
Har Us Nuur (China, Mongolia, and Russia); Irtysh (China, Mongolia, Russia, and Kazakhstan); 
Ob (China, Russia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan); Ili (China, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan); Tarim 
(China, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan); Indus (China, 
Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Nepal); Aral Sea (China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan); Ganges-Brahmaputra-Megha (China, India, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar); Irrawaddy (China, Myanmar, and India); Salween 
(China, Myanmar, and Thailand); Mekong (China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam); Beilun (China and Vietnam); Hsi (China and Vietnam); Red (China, Vietnam, and 
Laos); Amur (China, Russia, Mongolia, and North Korea); Suifen (China and Russia); Tumen 
(China, Russia, and North Korea); and Yalu (China and North Korea)). 
2016] China’s Management of Its International Rivers 229 
Amur River, Suifen River, Ussuri River, Tumen River, and Yalu River.6 In 
total, China’s international river basins constitute approximately 3,018,678 
square kilometers in area, which is around a third of the territory of China.7 
The presence of these international rivers in China has made this upstream 
riparian state the “water tower of Asia.”8 
Given its status as an important upstream riparian state and in light of 
the world’s fresh-water crisis, China ought to focus more in its international 
relations with its 14 neighboring states on transboundary water issues,9 espe-
cially since there is a risk that water scarcity and resource inequality of use of 
an international watercourse may lead to conflicts with these neighboring 
states.10 In the interest of mitigating such risks, it would be logical to expect 
China to play a leading role in cooperating with its riparian neighbors within 
the existing international legal framework in managing its international rivers 
and lakes.11 The current reality is the opposite, as it appears that China plays a 
passive role and somewhat stands apart from the international legal order 
when it comes to international cooperation in the management of transbound-
ary rivers and lakes,12 which arguably creates a greater risk of mismanage-
ment of its international river basins that could worsen water security prob-
lems and lead to adverse environmental consequences in the region.13 By 
playing a more active role within the international water-law regime, China 
could mitigate these risks.14 
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I describes the international 
water-law regime so that the reader better understands the paradigm from 
which this Article is written and the realm in which this Article hopes China 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Wolf et al., supra note 5, at 399–403; supra text accompanying note 5. 
 7 See Wolf et al., supra note 5, at 418 (stating that the total area of China’s territory is 
9,338,902 square kilometers and international river-basin areas within China make up around 
32.32% of its total territory). 
 8 He et al., supra note 3, at 22 (stating that twelve of the fifteen most important international 
rivers in the world originate within Chinese territory). 
 9 See Feng Yan & He Daming, Transboundary Water Vulnerability and Its Drivers in China, 
19 J. GEOGRAPHICAL SCI. 189 (2009). 
 10 See Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict, Fresh Water Resources and International Securi-
ty, 18 INT’L SEC. 79, 79–82 (1993). 
 11 See Water for Life Decade: Water Scarcity, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., http://
www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml [https://perma.cc/3V6L-6HUU] (last visited Mar. 
27, 2016) (reporting that water use has increased at twice the rate of population growth in the last 
century, and if prevailing conditions continue, by 2025 1.8 billion people will be living in water-
scarce regions and two-thirds of the world could live in water-stress conditions; water scarcity 
affects every region including China, which shows it already is facing physical water scarcity); see 
also Edith Brown Weiss, The Evolution of International Water Law, 331 RECEUIL DES COURS 
177–82 (2009). 
 12 See infra Parts II–III.  
 13 See infra Part III.  
 14 See infra Part IV.  
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will become more active in the future. Part II explores the law and practice of 
China’s management of its international rivers and lakes, with an eye towards 
evaluating China’s behavior in light of the international water-law regime. 
Part III asserts that China needs to play a greater role in international coopera-
tion when managing its international river basins if it is to fully enjoy its 
rights while avoiding the risk of international disputes. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL WATER-LAW REGIME 
The international water-law regime is a complex one, made up of nu-
merous treaties and softer regulations.15 This Part sets out the basics of those 
legal instruments, with particular emphasis being placed on the principles that 
govern the management of transboundary river basins. This overview of the 
international water-law regime is important inasmuch as it acts as the referent 
against which to assess China’s management of its international rivers. More-
over, it is believed that adhering to the international water-law regime’s 
standards for promoting cooperation, among other overarching principles, can 
help states realize the benefits of moving past the zero-sum mentality when it 
comes to the protection of shared resources. 
A. The Main Legal Instruments and Obligations 
The codification of international laws for the protection of watercourses 
first emerged under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 1923 Con-
vention Relative to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More 
than One State, where the right to carry out hydraulic power development 
within the territory of any riparian state is limited by international law.16 Fur-
thermore, Articles 3 and 4 of that Convention require riparian states to con-
sider other riparian states’ interests when developing their hydraulic power 
and to encourage states to enter into negotiations and conclude agreements on 
the execution of the riparian state’s operations.17 The International Law Asso-
ciation (ILA) drafted the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Interna-
tional Rivers of 1966 (1966 Helsinki Rules), which codified state practice 
when it comes to international watercourse usage, both with regard to naviga-
tional and non-navigational uses. 18 The international community generally 
has accepted these rules as customary international law.19 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra Section I.A–B. 
 16 See Geneva Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More 
than One State art. 1, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 76 (entered into force June 30, 1925). 
 17 See id. arts. 3–4. 
 18 See id.; Int’l Law Ass’n, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers arts. II–VIII, Report of the 52d Conf. 484 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Helsinki Rules] (ad-
dressing international drainage basins and their waters, which include “surface and underground 
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The U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 2669 in 1970, thereby 
allowing the International Law Commission to study the law of non-naviga-
tional uses of international watercourses.20 The study ultimately led to the 
adoption of the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997 Watercourses Con-
vention), which entered into force on August 17, 2014.21 The 1997 Water-
courses Convention defined a watercourse as “a system of surface waters and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary 
whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”22 An “[i]nternational 
watercourse” is a shared watercourse or international river and officially is 
defined as “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States.”23 
Therefore, the scope of the 1997 Watercourses Convention concerns not only 
the main stream of a river and streams that form or cross international bound-
aries, but also surface-water systems, groundwater channels, and tributaries 
and lakes that connect to international watercourses, with “confined trans-
boundary groundwater” being the only type of groundwater not covered by 
the Watercourses Convention.24 
The International Law Commission later adopted the 2008 Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (2008 Draft Articles), which defines 
an aquifer as “a permeable water-bearing geological formation underlain by a 
less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated zone of the for-
mation.”25 These articles attempted to address the issue of water pollution in 
an aquifer that causes groundwater management problems.26 The 2008 Draft 
Articles also require states to “take a precautionary approach in view of un-
                                                                                                                           
waters, flowing into a common terminus,” the usage of international drainage basins, and non-
exhaustive list factors that govern the equitable utilization of the waters). 
 19 See Int’l Law Ass’n, supra note 18; Salman M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN 
Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 
WATER RESOURCES DEV. 625, 630–31 (2007) (indicating that the 1966 Helsinki Rules are viewed 
as customary international law); see also INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
CHARLES BOURNE 84, 124 (Patricia Wouters ed., 1996). 
 20 G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV), at ¶ 1 (Dec. 8, 1970). 
 21 See 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.; G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 
1970) (stating appreciation of the International Law Commission’s work); Status of the Convention 
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&
lang=en [https://perma.cc/7UA2-FQHK] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (listing 36 parties to the conven-
tion). 
 22 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 21, art. 2(a) (emphasis added). 
 23 Id. art. 2(b). 
 24 See ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION: USER’S GUIDE 75 
(2012); STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 496–98 (2007). 
 25 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers art. 2(a), in Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. 
on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 19–79 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Draft 
Articles]. 
 26 Id. art. 12. 
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certainty about the nature and extent of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer 
system and of its vulnerability to pollution.”27 The requirement of states to 
take a precautionary approach to protect, preserve, and manage groundwater 
highlights the broader scope of protection of the law. This is further endorsed 
by the U.N. General Assembly. The General Assembly encouraged states to 
“make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper manage-
ment of their transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions of the 
draft articles.”28 
Both international instruments—the 1997 Watercourses Convention and 
the 2008 Draft Articles—set standards for the governance of international wa-
tercourses and include the no-harm rule, the principle of equitable and reason-
able utilization, and a general obligation to cooperate, inter alia.29 The 2008 
Draft Articles and the 1997 Watercourses Convention are important reference 
documents, which guide the formation of regional basin-level agreements.30 
The regulations in the 1997 Watercourses Convention were subse-
quently expanded in two main ways.31 First, they were expanded concerning 
the obligation to manage the shared watercourses in an equitable and reason-
able manner.32 The ILA kept in mind the developments over the previous 
forty years when updating the 1966 Helsinki Rules, which eventually were 
codified into the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources (2004 Berlin 
Rules).33 The 2004 Berlin Rules are based on the 1997 Watercourses Conven-
tion but are considered broader than the provisions in both the 1966 Helsinki 
Rules and the 1997 Watercourses Convention.34 Both the 1966 Helsinki Rules 
and the 1997 Watercourses Convention establish the right of riparian states to 
equitable and reasonable utilization in relation to the shared watercourse.35 
The development of the 2004 Berlin Rules ensured a management regime for 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See id. 
 28 G.A. Res. 66/104, ¶ 1 (Jan. 13, 2012). 
 29 See 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 25, arts. 4–7; 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra 
note 21, arts. 5–7. 
 30 See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Freshwater and International Law: The Interplay 
Between Universal, Regional and Basin Perspectives, The United Nations World Water Assess-
ment Programme, UNESCO 4 (2009); see, e.g., Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the 
Southern African Development Community art. 3, ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 10, Aug. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 321 
(2001); Agreement on the Cooperation for Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 
ch. III, Apr. 5, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995). 
 31 See generally 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 21; Int’l Law Ass’n, Water Re-
sources Comm., Berlin Conference on Water Resources Law: Fourth Report (2004) [hereinafter 
2004 Berlin Conference] (containing the 2004 Berlin Rules). 
 32 2004 Berlin Conference, supra note 31, at preface, arts. 13–16.  
 33 See id. at preface. 
 34 See id. at cmts. to arts. 1, 43, 64. 
 35 See 1966 Helsinki Rules, supra note 18, art. IV; 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra 
note 21, art. 5; see also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 
7, ¶ 78 (Sept. 25) (upholding the discussed principle). 
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the equitable and reasonable use of international drainage basins that would 
not cause significant harm to other basin states.36 The ILA set out require-
ments for joint-management arrangements in the equitable and sustainable 
utilization of watercourses in recognition of a change in circumstances37 from 
when it first formulated the rule that international watercourse use must be 
equitable and reasonable in 1966. 38  The 2004 Berlin Rules define 
“[m]anagement of waters” to include “the development, use, protection, allo-
cation, regulation, and control of waters.”39 Such a definition gives rise to an 
obligation on all riparian states to equitably and reasonably manage the wa-
ters within an international drainage basin.40 
Second, the regulations in the 1997 Watercourses Convention were ex-
panded in relation to the transboundary impact on ecosystems.41 Since com-
ing into force in 1996, the 1992 U.N. Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992 Helsinki Con-
vention) has emphasized the obligation not to cause significant harm, as ex-
emplified in Article 2(1), which states, “The Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact.”42 Nota-
bly, the scope of “transboundary impact” not only covers flora and fauna but 
also “climate, landscape and historical monuments or other physical struc-
tures or the interaction among these factors; [it] also include[s] effects on the 
cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to 
those factors.”43 The 1992 Helsinki Convention aims to prevent transbounda-
ry water pollution and incorporates environmental principles including the 
obligation to carry out environmental impact assessments, sustainable water 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See 2004 Berlin Conference, supra note 31, art. 12. 
 37 See id. at preface (reasoning that the decline in water per capita has presented new chal-
lenges to the international water-law regime since 1966 and that the expansion of international 
human-rights law in addressing environmental degradation has given rise to customary norms in 
responding to international watercourses). 
 38 See id. arts. 64–65. 
 39 Id. art. 3(14). 
 40 See id. arts. 3(4), 64–65. 
 41 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes art. 2(1), Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter 1992 Helsinki Convention]. 
 42 See id. This treaty originally was a regional instrument, but it was amended in 2003 (and en-
tered into force on Feb. 6, 2013) to make it an international convention that permitted countries outside 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe region to become parties, which led to 39 coun-
tries becoming parties to the convention. See generally Status of the Amendments to Articles 25 and 
26 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXVII-5-b&chapter=27&lang=en [https://perma.cc/VX7B-5F7H] (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016). 
 43 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra note 41, art. 1(2). 
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use, the polluter-pays principle, and the precautionary principle.44 All of these 
principles encapsulate the decision of the Council of the European Union to 
“strengthen international cooperation [to enforce a] high-level of protection” 
of the environment, while protecting human health and utilizing water re-
sources in a rational and sustainable manner.45 In practice, preventative action 
and rectifying environmental damage are crucial in adhering to the Conven-
tion. Application of the principles means the following:  
• The precautionary principle requires that the release of hazardous sub-
stances must be avoided even where there is no proven harm between 
the substances and transboundary impact;  
• The polluter-pay principle requires that the polluter bear the costs of 
pollution prevention, reduction, and control;  
• Sustainable water use means that water utilization and management by 
the present generation must not interfere with the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their water needs; and 
• The implementation of environmental impact assessments is a means 
of cooperation between riparian states that may be formulated within 
basin-level agreements.46 
As compared with the 1997 Watercourses Convention, the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention places more emphasis on the protection of water ecosystems.47 
Furthermore, the 1992 Helsinki Convention requires states to enter into “bi-
lateral or multilateral agreements or other arrangements . . . to eliminate the 
contradictions with the basic principles of this Convention, in order to define 
their mutual relations and conduct regarding the prevention, control and re-
duction of transboundary impact.”48 Such agreements are supported by the 
obligation to establish joint bodies in accordance with Article 9(2) of the 1992 
Helsinki Convention, which should govern water quantity and quality in the 
stipulated manner, including collection, compilation, and evaluation of data 
on pollution sources, and assessment of water-waste control programs.49 
Both demand management and resource-use management need to be 
balanced at all levels of government. This gives rise to obligations concerning 
the manner of use and protection of the shared watercourse. The 1997 Water-
courses Convention seeks to embody both of these balancing paradigms 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. arts. 2(5)(a)–(b), 3(1)(h); see also LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH 
WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124–26 (2013) (discussing these principles). 
 45 Council Decision 95/308 1995 O.J. (L 186/42).  
 46 See id. arts. 2(5)(a)–(c), 3(1)(h). 
 47 Compare 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 21, arts. 20–21, with 1992 Helsinki 
Convention, supra note 41, arts. 2–3. 
 48 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra note 41, art. 9(1). 
 49 See id. art. 9(2). 
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through the obligation to cooperate.50 Aside from the explicit obligation under 
Article 8 (General Obligation to Cooperate), the obligation also is implicit 
elsewhere, such as Article 5 (Equitable and Reasonable Utilization), Article 7 
(Obligations Not to Cause Significant Harm), and Article 9 (Regular Ex-
change of Data and Information) as well as Part III (Planned Measures), Part 
IV (Protection, Preservation, and Management), and Part V (Harmful Condi-
tions and Emergency Situations).51 
Article 5 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention encourages watercourse 
states to negotiate over the uses of the shared watercourses.52 This provision 
is supported further by the prior notification and consultation mechanisms 
contained in Articles 8, 9, and 11.53 Although the articles refer to planned pro-
jects, the language in Article 18 provides, “If a watercourse [s]tate has rea-
sonable grounds to believe that another watercourse [s]tate is planning 
measures that may have a significant adverse effect upon it, the former [s]tate 
may request the latter to apply the provisions of article 12.”54 In other words, 
the latter state would still be required to consult with the former even if the 
measures were not planned.55 These provisions support the requirement under 
the international water-law regime for riparian states to act in an equitable 
and reasonable manner and to take into account their use of the shared water-
course as well as their obligation not to cause significant harm to another ri-
parian state. 56  The process of notification and consultation is meant to 
achieve that common goal.57 
This Section has described the basic legal instruments associated with 
the international water-law regime. The following Section focuses on the 
main principles from the international water-law regime that govern the man-
agement of transboundary river basins, as they relate to China’s management 
of its international rivers. 
B. Principles in Relation to the Management of  
Transboundary River Basins 
Equitable utilization requires the management of an international drain-
age basin in an equitable and reasonable manner.58 “Management of waters” 
is defined in Article 3(14) of the 2004 Berlin Rules as “the development, use, 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 21, arts. 5, 8–9, 11. 
 51 See id. arts. 5, 9, 11, pts. III, V. 
 52 See id. art. 5. 
 53 See id. arts. 8, 9, 11. 
 54 Id. art. 18(1). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. art. 7. 
 57 See id. pt. III. 
 58 See 2004 Berlin Conference, supra note 31, art. 12. 
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protection, allocation, regulation, and control of waters.”59 Such management 
must be careful not to harm other states, and it also needs to provide enough 
protection to the watercourses.60 The ILA recognizes sustainability as a basic 
principle that needs to be effectively balanced as between development on the 
one hand and “social, environmental and ecological values” on the other.61 
Looking at each of the two sides, states must take into account Articles 12 
(Equitable Utilization), 13 (Determining an Equitable and Reasonable Use), 
and 14 (Preferences Among Uses) of the 2004 Berlin Rules when considering 
their right to use an international watercourse.62 Moreover, Article 12 (Equi-
table Utilization) requires the management of an international drainage basin 
in an equitable and reasonable manner.63 Therefore, the balancing mechanism 
of Articles 12, 13, and 14 relies on the cooperation of states, as alluded to in 
Article 11.64 The requirement to manage the international drainage basin in 
an equitable and reasonable manner—which ensures the balanced use and 
protection as between the states and is consistent with the need to protect the 
waters—should take into consideration the relevant factors listed in Article 
13, including the “minimization of environmental harm.”65 It must be empha-
sized that there is no preference for one use over another, although Article 14 
makes explicit the requirement that equitable and reasonable use calls for the 
needs of humans to be given top priority.66 The Commentary on Article 14 
states that while “vital human needs” does not extend to general economic 
activities, such as the provision of jobs, these factors still could be weighed 
against the obligations of ecological integrity and sustainable development in 
Articles 12 and 13.67 
The attainment of the optimal and sustainable use of the international 
watercourse is stipulated in Article 5(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
and Article 12 of the 2004 Berlin Rules, which contain a balancing process 
supported by the duty to cooperate as well as mechanisms for notification.68 
These aspects within the two regimes complement the requirement to negoti-
ate.69 States should conclude that such agreements—particularly as they re-
late to the impact of climate change on water resources, population growth, 
and multiplication of uses of water—have heightened tensions over scarce 
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 60 See id. art. 12. 
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water resources.70 Where such agreements already exist, their implementation 
through the exchange of information, notification of planned measures, and 
the pursuit of any river-basin agreements to regulate management of the 
transboundary aquifer between riparian states must be pursued in accordance 
with the international water-law regime.71 
It must be noted here that China is highly dependent on fresh water re-
sources for its own domestic needs and economic industrialization and urban-
ization, and it is challenged by annual water shortages of around 53.6 billion 
cubic meters.72 With groundwater depletion rates being especially high in 
certain parts of China, it suffers from water scarcity in its agricultural and 
industrial sectors, as well as with domestic consumption.73  
This Section provided an overview of the international water-law regime 
and discussed the manner in which the regime has expanded the scope of pro-
tection of river basins to enable legal regulation of activities that impact river 
ecosystems. This expansion has occurred in recognition of the limitations of 
the 1997 Watercourses Convention, which did not include the protection of 
groundwater or directly incorporate the management of transboundary water 
resources that would address water pollution issues.74 The regulations—the 
1992 Helsinki Convention, the 2004 Berlin Rules, and the 2008 Draft Arti-
cles—aimed to rectify these limitations.75 The international water-law regime 
now incorporates these areas by requiring certain management practices of 
transboundary resources by riparian states.76 The next Part examines China’s 
law and policy for managing its transboundary water resources, keeping in 
mind the international standards discussed in this Part, which act as the refer-
ent against which to assess state behavior in this area in general. 
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II. LAW AND POLICY OF CHINA’S WATER-LAW MANAGEMENT 
This Part provides an overview of China’s practice for managing its in-
ternational rivers and lakes. First, it summarizes China’s domestic legislation 
for managing its water resources, and then it compares this legislation to what 
the 1997 Watercourses Convention requires, while keeping in mind the chal-
lenges arising from China’s domestic water security. Second, this Part ex-
plores China’s participation in international fora that deal with international 
water law. 
A. China’s Domestic Law and Policy 
In terms of domestic water policies and laws, China has enacted five 
comprehensive pieces of legislation: the Water Law of China of 2002, the 
Environmental Protection Law of China of 1989, the Law on the Prevention 
and Control of Water Pollution of 1984, the Flood Control Law of 1997, and 
the Law on Water and Soil Conservation of 1991.77 For the purposes of this 
Article, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution of 1984 
and the Water Law of China of 2002 represent the most relevant laws, and for 
reasons of time and space, this Article focuses on these two laws. In particu-
lar, this Section analyzes the Water Law of China of 2002, as it is the main 
legislative vehicle China uses to manage its international rivers. 
By way of background, the National People’s Congress (NPC) enacts 
such laws while the Ministry of Water Resources is the responsible superviso-
ry body for water administration. 78  Historically, the ministry was formed 
from the merging of the Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of Electric 
Power, and after its reorganization in July 1988, its renewed function became 
to “rationally develop[], utiliz[e], conserv[e] and protect[] water resources, 
prevent[] and control[] water disasters, bring[] about sustainable utilization of 
water resources, and meet[] the need[s] of national economic and social de-
velopment.”79 Therefore, the ministry has a function not only to ensure that 
                                                                                                                           
 77 SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & DANIEL D. BRADLOW, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR WA-
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 78 See id. at 36–45 (providing background information on China’s legal and regulatory water-
resources framework); Overview, MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES OF CHINA, http://www.mwr.
gov.cn/english/aboutmwr.html [https://perma.cc/289C-B5ED] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (provid-
ing information on the supervisory authority of water affairs in China). 
 79 Water Law of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 
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2016] China’s Management of Its International Rivers 239 
water resources are reasonably utilized, conserved, and protected, but also to 
develop water resources and to ensure their sustainable usage.80 
Shortly after the ministry’s reorganization, the Twenty-Fourth Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People’s Congress adopted 
the Water Law on January 21, 1988, with revisions to this law adopted at the 
Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress on August 29, 2002, which took effect on October 1, 
2002.81 The law only covers the territory of China, although it addresses in-
ternational treaties and agreements on international rivers to which China has 
acceded.82 In cases where international treaties contain different provisions 
from those provided in the Water Law of China of 2002, China can apply an 
exception through a reservation to the treaty.83 
Water resources under the Water Law of China of 2002 include surface 
water and groundwater,84 which are owned by the state with the exception of 
ponds belonging to rural economic collectives. 85  Significantly, the State 
Council has charged individual administrative regions with some local man-
agement of water resources, and it has charged the Ministry of Water Re-
sources with the task of overseeing the overall supervision of the state’s water 
resources.86 In addition, Article 12 of the Water Law of China of 2002 author-
izes the ministry to establish river-basin authorities within China for the “uni-
fied management of and supervision over [the] water resources.”87 Such “uni-
fied” management obviously requires cooperation between regions. 88  The 
requirement to establish river-basin authorities and joint bodies and the re-
quirement to cooperate across regions reflect the general obligation to coop-
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erate within international water law, which can be found in Article 8 of the 
1997 Watercourses Convention. In particular, Article 8(2) of the 1997 Water-
courses Convention stipulates that the manner of cooperation between the 
riparian parties may be through the establishment of joint mechanisms.89 As 
the World Bank has noted, however, Article 12 of the Water Law of China of 
2002 is ambiguous because it does not clearly stipulate which authority ought 
to establish a river-basin authority, creating a vacuum within the system and 
frustrating effective enforcement efforts.90 
Utilization of water resources under the Water Law of China of 2002 
must comply with the regulations and provisions on Planning for Water Re-
sources (Chapter II), Protection of Water Resources, Water Areas, and Wa-
terworks (Chapter III), Allocation and Economical Use of Water Resources 
(Chapter IV), Resolution of Disputes and Supervision (Chapter V), and Legal 
Liabilities (Chapter VI) under the Water Law of China.91 Like the 1997 Wa-
tercourses Convention, utilization is subject to conditions and regulations.92 
For example, Article 14 of the Water Law of China of 2002 provides that uni-
fied plans for the entire river basin must be made for the purposes of “devel-
opment, utilization, conservation and protection of water resources.”93 These 
aspects are reflected in the 1997 Watercourses Convention, which regulates 
activities affecting utilization and development (Articles 5 and 6), as well as 
conservation and protection (Articles 20, 21, and 23).94 It is important, how-
ever, to keep in mind that when it comes to the unified supervision and man-
agement of water resources (provided in Article 12 of the Water Law of China 
of 2002) and the unified plan to develop, utilize, conserve, and protect water 
resources (provided in Article 14), the “unifying” element is not the same as 
cooperation between the different internal regions, but rather cooperation 
with the central government.95 Indeed, the central government must formulate 
the unifying plans and direct the unified management and supervision of the 
shared water resources.96 These two aspects fall within the same meaning of 
“management” as in Article 24 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention.97 The 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Compare Water Law of China, art. 12, with 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra note 21, 
art. 8. 
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“joint” aspect is lacking, however, and it cannot be said that China adopts any 
joint-management mechanism internally through the Water Law of China of 
2002.98 
Article 16 of the Water Law of China of 2002 also sets out the require-
ment for state administrative departments and river-basin authorities to estab-
lish hydrological data systems to conduct surveys and assessments for the 
purposes of monitoring water resources.99 This complements any plans to 
divert water because such diversion would require hydrological data to sup-
port a needs assessment of the river basins from which the water is being di-
verted.100 Undoubtedly the law would be more effective if there were a pro-
cedural mechanism as provided in the 1997 Watercourses Convention, where 
parties with planned measures are to enter a notification and consultation pro-
cess.101 
In sum, the Water Law of China of 2002, in combination with the Law 
on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (2008 amended),102 pos-
sesses some elements of international water law in relation to the manage-
ment of water resources.103 Such elements are clear in Article 14, which pro-
vides for unified plans for the entire river for the purposes of developing and 
protecting water resources.104 Although the language generally reflects the 
1997 Watercourses Convention, the language that the riparian parties must 
come together to exchange data and devise joint-management plans reflects 
the unifying aspect of the Chinese central government.105 However, the law 
does not provide for any joint-management mechanisms or cooperation be-
tween the regions.106 Likewise, Article 12 of the Water Law of China of 2002 
requires the establishment of joint river-basin authorities, but it fails to speci-
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fy which authority ought to take up such a role.107 The Water Law of China of 
2002, in combination with the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water 
Pollution (2008 amended),108 has the beginnings of a modern type of river-
governance scheme based on cooperation and consensus between members of 
the river-basin authority or the local water-administrative authorities.109 The 
lack of authority of these bodies, however, prevents this from being fully im-
plemented.110 What remains is a centralized system of water resource alloca-
tion and governance, which is supported by weak water-related institutions.111 
The amended Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution attempts 
to reform China’s weak water governance mechanism by addressing the dis-
crepancies and overlaps in supervision and management by government de-
partments contained in the legislation of the former Law on the Prevention 
and Control of Water Pollution and Water Law.112 The legal reforms took 
place in tandem with the bureaucratic changes that took place in 2008—with 
the former State Environmental Protection Administration being elevated to 
the ministerial level and renamed the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion.113 In support of these reforms, the NPC attempted to improve enforce-
ment of the law by imposing stricter penalties for polluters (even allowing for 
the first time in law public action against polluters) and environmental protec-
tion control targets to be monitored with reference to local officials’ profes-
sional performance.114  
With these laws and policies in mind, the following Section elaborates 
on the challenges posed by China’s water-security situation regarding the re-
alization of the international standards provided in the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention and elsewhere. 
B. Challenges to Water Security in China 
The Water Law of China of 2002 and other pieces of legislation need to 
meet the challenges of China’s water-security situation.115 This Section high-
lights some of those challenges and analyzes the manner in which these chal-
lenges are being addressed. 
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China’s water supply has three main features.116 First, the total volume 
of water resources per annum amounts to approximately 2840 million cubic 
meters, which gives China the sixth-highest volume of water supply in the 
world.117 However, the amount of exploitable water resources, which includes 
water that cannot be accessed for use, is more like 814 billion cubic meters, 
with present water supplies at 607 cubic meters per capita—roughly the aver-
age level of water consumption in the world.118 When it comes to demand, 
population growth exerts significant pressure on current water supplies.119 
Therefore, better planning is needed in order for China’s limited water supply 
to meet the growing needs of an increasing population.120 
Second, there is an uneven concentration of water resources in China, 
with “[m]ore than 80% of water resources . . . in South [China and] less than 
20% in the North.”121 Such irregularity in distribution of water resources is 
exacerbated by an uneven distribution of population throughout the country, 
with relatively low population density in the abundantly water-resourced 
northwest and southwest of China and higher population density (and hence 
higher water needs) along the length of the eastern seaboard and into the in-
dustrialized northeast.122 The results of these imbalances place many parts of 
northern China (particularly the Yellow-Hai-Huai river basins) as well as cer-
tain areas of southern China (for example, the Pearl River Basin) under water 
stress.123 As a result, water-transfer activities need to take into account the 
growth of local economies and populations of each region.124 
Third, in spite of China’s abundance of river basins, most supplies come 
from small- and medium-sized rivers; of China’s 45,000 rivers with a basin 
area of greater than 50 square kilometers, 95 percent have a basin area of un-
der 1000 square kilometers, while 80 percent of China’s 1600 lakes have an 
area of under 10 square kilometers.125 Water supplies are vulnerable to natural 
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climate conditions, including precipitation and drought.126 Runoff from rivers 
during the winter accounts for only 3 percent of a river’s annual runoff in 
northern China and 10 percent of its annual run-off in southern China.127 In 
order to meet the challenges of population growth and urbanization within the 
constraints of China’s water supply, management activities must focus on 
adjusting local economy structures to the region’s water conditions (otherwise 
known as “optimizing zones”), enforcing utilization caps, enacting water-
conservation measures in tandem with water-tariff reforms, and promoting 
water-saving industries.128 
Other management efforts have focused on mega-engineering projects 
such as the Three Gorges Dam and the current South-North Transfer Pro-
ject. 129  The South-North Transfer Project is an enormous water-diversion 
scheme that will transfer approximately 44.8 billion cubic meters of water per 
annum from the Yangtze River along three routes—the east, middle, and 
west—up to the dry north by 2050.130 The scheme is not without its contro-
versies because diversion of such large amounts of water has a significant 
impact on the aquifer environment in the Yangtze River Delta and surround-
ing rivers, including the Yellow River and the Han River.131 Further contro-
versy arises from the forced relocation of people living in the area.132 In addi-
tion, the Ministry of Environmental Protection recently closed down local 
aquaculture industries that have been causing pollution in order to maintain 
water-quality levels with the water involved in the diversion project.133 
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China’s economic growth poses further challenges to its water resource 
management policies in the form of its insatiable appetite for energy.134 The 
utilization of water to generate energy—in particular in coal-fired power sta-
tions—is exhausting China’s limited water supplies and causing environmen-
tal damage as well.135 For example, around 5 cubic meters of groundwater is 
required to remove and wash one ton of coal, with a further 7.6 cubic meters 
required for converting one ton of coal into electricity; the energy-generation 
process for one ton of coal uses up to 15 cubic meters of water—although for 
larger coal-fired electricity generation plants, up to 3050 cubic meters of wa-
ter are used every hour.136 Such water-usage numbers do not reflect the dis-
charge of waste by coal chemical plants—one plant in Shanxi released in ex-
cess of 6.1 million tons of polluted water per annum.137 China’s Twelfth Five-
Year Plan established coal-fired electricity generation plants in northern Chi-
na in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Hei-
longjiang.138 These localities account for 79 percent of China’s total coal re-
serves, yet they are faced with the challenge of having only 9.98 percent of 
China’s total water resources.139 This places huge pressure on aquifer with-
drawals, which are estimated to be between 15 to 20 percent of China’s water 
supplies.140 
China plans to slow the depletion of its water supplies through direct 
measures, such as the enforcement of water-withdrawal caps—reported at 700 
billion cubic meters per year until 2030—or indirect measures, such as reduc-
ing the dependency on coal-fired electricity through encouraging the renewable 
energy and nuclear power industries.141 Notwithstanding such plans, there does 
not seem to be any prospect that these industries will radically take over the 
energy-generation burden from coal-fired plants.142 On the contrary, the Chi-
nese government plans to expand its coal-fired plants to generate 453 gigawatts 
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of energy by 2020.143 This begs the question whether China would be able to 
continue with its power-generation plans while protecting its water supplies.144 
Since power generation and water supply are inversely proportional, it would 
appear that water supply would be affected where plans for power generation 
go ahead—especially with the kinds of power-generation that depend on water 
utilization.145 Water scarcity will continue to be a significant problem for Chi-
na. Therefore, a stronger and more effective water management and governance 
system may be needed to address these issues.146 
C. Hydropower Projects and Downstream Riparians 
China already has the largest number of dams in the world (approxi-
mately 25,000), and it also has the world’s largest group of electricity con-
sumers.147 These numbers inevitably will increase as a result of the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan.148 The State Council announced in its Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
for 2010–15 that China would expand its hydropower capacity from 220 gi-
gawatts in 2010 to 290 gigawatts in 2015, which constitutes an average annu-
al growth of 5.7 percent.149 Reports have even suggested that China plans to 
increase significantly its hydropower capacity to 568 gigawatts by 2030.150 
Notwithstanding such ambitions, commentators previously had suggested that 
China may struggle to meet its 2015 target to construct new hydropower 
plants due to enforced requirements of construction developers to complete 
feasibility studies and environmental-impact assessments.151 In fact, it seems 
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that China may have met its 2015 goal a year early.152 In 2015, China’s hy-
dropower capacity reached 320 gigawatts.153 
The thirteen-dam cascade construction on the Salween (or Nu) River 
will produce a total hydroelectricity capacity of approximately twenty-one 
gigawatts.154 For three of these dams located in the Lower Salween River 
region, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand is a co-partner with 
China in the construction, with Thailand being the primary consumer of the 
electricity the dams generate.155 The dams at Songta, Maji, Yabiluo, Liuku, 
and Saige are situated in a UNESCO World Heritage Site, the Three Parallel 
Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas.156 In addition, these five dams, which re-
ceived State Council priority listing as dams constructed in the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan, sit in a high-risk seismic-activity zone that may cause them to col-
lapse—either during an earthquake or during severe flooding, which may po-
tentially cause further damage downstream.157 
In the Mekong River Basin—which is shared with Myanmar and the 
downstream states Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam—one major dam 
construction project is the Mekong Dam Cascade, which is to be completed 
by 2025 and will have an electricity capacity of 15,000 megawatts or approx-
imately 80 percent of the capacity of the Three Gorges Dam.158 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the lower-riparian states have not challenged China’s actions, 
nor have they aggressively encouraged China to join the river-basin authori-
ty.159 One reason for this may be that Chinese dam construction already is 
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taking place in these lower-riparian states, and so they might already enjoy 
similar benefits as those of China.160 
China has financed and constructed 46 percent of the hydroelectric ca-
pacity in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar in the period from 2006 to 2011.161 
In turn, all three riparian states plan to export this electricity to China.162 Laos 
reportedly has called itself “the battery of Asia” because almost all of Laos’s 
electricity (as of 2007) came from hydropower, of which a third was export-
ed—approximately 678 million kilowatts per hour.163 Moreover, hydropower 
generation represents approximately a third of Laos’s total exports, making 
hydropower generation an extremely significant export industry for Laos.164 
In Myanmar, it is estimated that almost all of the riparian state’s electric-
ity needs will be supplied by hydropower by 2030.165 Chinese and Thai in-
vestments have greatly helped with the mega-construction of the Myistone 
facility, which has a generation capacity of 6000 megawatts and which taps 
into Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River Basin.166 Much of this electricity is export-
ed to China and Thailand.167 
Even though Cambodia does not share a border with China, China has 
supported the financing and construction of several dams in Cambodia, in-
cluding the Kamchay Dam (in Kampot province) and the Lower Sesan 2 
Dam (in Stung Treng province).168 Both projects have had their own contro-
versies. For the Kamchay Dam, there were environmental problems because 
the dam was located in a national park and the environmental impact assess-
ment came through only after the dam was almost completed.169 In addition, 
local inhabitants complained that they did not have access to electricity be-
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cause the majority of it was transmitted to the state’s capital.170 The Lower 
Sesan 2 Dam also had the issue of an inadequate environmental impact as-
sessment, and the dam construction company was not transparent in its relo-
cation plans for the people living in the area.171 
The cases above show economic cooperation between China and its 
Southeast Asian neighbors with regard to its shared transboundary water re-
sources.172 It is estimated that there are a total of 304 Chinese dams overseas, 
with 38 percent located in Southeast Asia and 27 percent in Africa.173 As can 
be seen in this Section, however, the environmental and social impact of Chi-
na’s construction of dams overseas complicates the cooperation between the 
states to the extent that, other than complying with environmental assess-
ments during the construction, the riparian states do not share a joint-
management mechanism that can deal with all of the economic, environmen-
tal, and sustainable development issues of associated with surface waters.174 
Missed targets for dam construction in China under the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan may be the reason for refocusing the Thirteenth Five-Year policies 
on environmental protection.175 The theme behind the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan—to build a “Beautiful China”—emphasizes improving environmental 
governance.176 Such environmental governance initiatives include pollution 
control and environmental protection. 177  In particular, there are planned 
measures to “improve the water environment in river basin areas.”178 There is 
no explicit mention of whether such planned measures include hydropower 
construction as of yet, or whether the promulgated stricter enforcements of 
the Environmental Protection Law of China under the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan will result in a different policy emphasis with regard to dam construc-
tion. This could represent an opportunity for China to reassess its planned 
hydropower projects, especially in the Mekong and Irrawaddy, among others, 
in terms of the manner in which it manages its relations with its downstream 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Urban & Nordensvard, supra note 162. 
 171 See Lower Sesan 2 Dam, INT’L RIVERS, www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/lower-
sesan-2-dam [https://perma.cc/UVG9-KRXR] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 172 See Urban & Nordensvard, supra note 162. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. at 3. 
 175 See Owen Haacke, NDRC Prepares for Next Five-Year Plan, Focuses on Quality over 
Quantity, US-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, www.uschina.org/ndrc-prepares-next-five-year-plan-
focuses-quality-over-quantity [https://perma.cc/4FQQ-JLAC] (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
 176 See Interpreting China’s Proposed 13th Five-Year Plan, Beijing Review, www.bjreview.
com/ceshi/ceshi/201602/t20160226_800050125.html [https://perma.cc/2EZM-LYJQ] (last visited 
June 9, 2016). 
 177 See Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council, Report on the Work of the Government 
Delivered at the Fourth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic 
of China on Mar. 5, 2016, at 29, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2748106/LiKeqiang-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RLC-9F8B]. 
 178 Id. at 30. 
250 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:227 
riparian neighbors so that they can comprehensively address the economic, 
environmental, and sustainable development issues of their international wa-
tercourses. 
D. Factors Affecting the Risk of Disputes 
China’s relationship with neighboring aquifer states affects the manner 
in which China chooses to manage transboundary water resources.179 For ex-
ample, China has long enjoyed close relations with North Korea, and as a 
result there is considerable cooperation between the two states on the man-
agement of the Yalu River and the Tumen River.180 Taking the example of the 
Tumen River first, China entered into an agreement (with North Korea and 
Russia) and a supplementary agreement (with North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea, and Mongolia) to establish a coordination and consultative commis-
sion—both of which provide that the parties will cooperate on development 
of the Great Tumen area in a way that does not harm the region’s environ-
ment.181 The Yalu River is a successful example of river-basin cooperation 
between China and North Korea.182 Both states entered into an agreement to 
set up the China-Korea Hydropower Corporation, which was jointly respon-
sible for establishing and managing three hydropower plants along the Yalu 
River; all electricity power generated was equally shared between the two 
states.183 In these examples, the risk of dispute is low due to the high degree 
of cooperation between the states.184 
By contrast, China enjoys less affectionate relations with Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan, and therefore, there are fewer examples of cooper-
ation between these riparian states with respect to the management of the Ili 
River and the Itrysh River.185 China began a large water-diversion project in 
the Itrysh River, which already was heavily polluted from untreated waste 
being discharged by coal smelters and factories, to send water to Xinjiang’s 
oil fields as well as to western China to aid in its industrial and commercial 
development as part of China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan.186 Kazakhstan has not 
yet challenged China over its water diversions, but the likelihood may in-
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crease as water resources gradually diminish.187 Similarly, China also is di-
verting water resources in the Ili River to supply water to the western region 
of China.188 These cases illustrate a higher risk of dispute as a function of a 
low degree of cooperation between these states.189 
In the Amur River, which borders China and Russia, the two states man-
aged in 2004 to delimit their border and settle their claims regarding the terri-
torial sovereignty of disputed islands.190 Russia allowed the sovereignty of 
half of the Bolshoi Ussuriski Island and all of Tarabarov Island (located on 
the Amur River) to be given to China.191 In the course of the transfer, both 
states signed a joint-use agreement that would allow joint economic use by 
Russia and China of the disputed islands being transferred to China.192 The 
joint-use agreement also invalidated the unilateral regulations imposed by the 
regional authorities in Khabarovsk that had previously excluded China.193 
The joint-use agreement overrode such exclusions and allowed Chinese ves-
sels the right to sail around the islands that China has claimed, with Russia 
also being allowed to continue to use the islands in the manner it always had 
done.194 This enabled a smooth transfer of sovereignty of the islands to China 
on the part of Russia.195 It also illustrates a successful example of joint utili-
zation and management of transboundary water resources in avoiding conflict 
between states.196 Both states subsequently have started planning hydropower 
plants along the Amur River in addition to establishing a free-trade zone 
along the Suifen River.197 
The examples provided in this Section illustrate that the conclusion of 
water-resource agreements may assist in the joint management of shared wa-
ter resources and greater cooperation within a legal framework.198 Without 
such agreements, the risks that accompany territorial disputes remain, along 
with weaker cooperation on water resource management.199 The following 
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Section discusses China’s participation in international fora, with the goal 
being to show how China is an active participant in international fora in the 
area of environment and natural resources. 
E. China’s Participation in International Fora 
China generally has shown its support for the betterment of the envi-
ronment through its ratification of a number of environment-related trea-
ties.200 For example, China has ratified the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change,201 the Convention on Biological Diversity,202 the Rotterdam 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,203 the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, 204  and the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification in those 
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Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly 
in Africa.205 China also has joined the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer.206 However, China has neither signed nor ratified the 1992 Hel-
sinki Convention or the 1997 Watercourses Convention. 207  China voted 
against the 1997 Watercourses Convention, in the words of China’s repre-
sentative Gao Feng, on the basis that: “A watercourse State enjoys indisputa-
ble territorial sovereignty over those parts of international watercourses that 
flow through its territory. It is incomprehensible and regrettable that the draft 
Convention does not affirm this principle.”208 In line with its position on terri-
torial sovereignty, China has invoked its sovereign right over natural re-
sources and economic rights and duties of a state.209 China has supported the 
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U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which 
complement China’s socialist and development mandate and track record of 
utilizing its natural resources to build its economy and eradicate poverty per-
manently from society.210 
The U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources was passed at the 1194th U.N. General Assembly Plenary 
Meeting on December 14, 1962, which emphasized economic development 
and independence in developing countries and human rights vis-à-vis the 
right to self-determination.211 This resolution was the basis for enabling for-
mer colonized states to achieve economic independence and wealth through 
the exploitation of their natural resources for the good of their people.212 In 
particular, the resolution recognized “the inalienable right of all States freely 
to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their na-
tional interests, and on respect for the economic independence of States.”213 
Notwithstanding such respect of a state’s permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, it is subject to a number of provisos.214 First, a state’s “free and 
beneficial” use of permanent sovereignty over its natural resources must be 
accompanied by “mutual respect” of another state’s permanent sovereignty 
over its natural resources on the basis of the principle of “sovereign equali-
ty.”215 Second, a violation of another state’s permanent sovereignty over its 
natural resources negatively affects the rights of individuals and would be 
“contrary to the spirit” of the U.N. Charter.216 
These two points are crucial to understanding that China’s invocation of 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over its natural resources is not an 
absolute right.217 Indeed, Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development makes clear that states have the “sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies,” but this right is limited by “the responsibility to ensure that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
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ment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”218 
Accordingly, when applied to the management of shared natural resources 
and transboundary aquifers, China cannot act unilaterally and utilize a shared 
watercourse, aquifer, or aquifer system without respecting another state’s 
right to its permanent sovereignty over the same shared water resources in-
asmuch as it might cause damage to the other state’s use of that shared water-
course.219 Hence, the statement made by China’s representative, Gao Feng, 
objecting to the vote on the 1997 Watercourses Convention is only accurate to 
the extent that the above two points are respected.220 To be clear, the case for 
China to use its natural resources to develop its economy is overwhelmingly 
legitimate.221 In spite of its recent economic successes, China remains a de-
veloping country because income levels remain at a much lower level than 
developed countries.222 In addition, even though the proportion of the Chi-
nese population living in poverty in 2001 dramatically fell to only 8 percent 
from 53 percent in 1981, the World Bank has pointed out that the progress 
cannot be viewed in isolation because the rate of income inequality has risen 
steadily, which essentially slows poverty reduction.223 In short, China has not 
eradicated poverty, despite its poverty-reduction programs.224 Of course, this 
is not an indicator of developed-country status, inasmuch as even the most 
developed countries still struggle with poverty eradication. Regardless, the 
challenge for China going forward is to continue to enforce its right to perma-
nent sovereignty over its natural resources while at the same time complying 
with those same rights of its riparian neighbors.225 The following Part explains 
how more active participation by China in the international water-law regime 
could help protect its rights to permanent sovereignty over its natural re-
sources. 
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III. TOWARDS GREATER PARTICIPATION IN THE  
INTERNATIONAL WATER-LAW REGIME 
This Part explores the reasons why China needs to play a greater role 
within the international legal framework in managing its international river 
basins. First, it provides a brief overview of the 2008 Draft Articles on the 
Law on Transboundary Aquifers, which attempts to address the inadequacies 
of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. The 1997 Watercourses Convention 
did not cover confined transboundary groundwater and did not sufficiently 
address protection of the river ecosystems. The fact that the 2008 Draft Arti-
cles exist shows the evolving international law in this area. As China has 
signed up to various environmental treaties, as emphasized in the previous 
Part, one positive way of interpreting that would be that China is trying to 
show it cares about the environment. Therefore, the analysis of the 2008 Draft 
Articles provided in this Part shows that they would be a good model for 
China to aim towards for its international river governance. Second, this Part 
sets out the main elements of the obligation to cooperate with regard to the 
management of international river basins under international law. Third, it 
analyzes the obstacles to greater cooperation by China. Fourth, this Part con-
cludes with suggestions for reform. 
A. Management of Aquifers 
International water law has evolved significantly in recent years, and its 
scope of protection not only covers transboundary rivers, lakes, and water-
courses (known as surface waters), but also transboundary aquifers and aqui-
fer systems that include groundwaters.226 Previously, the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention covered surface waters not connected to confined transboundary 
groundwaters, with the result that the regime lacked adequate sustainability 
and legal protection for such confined transboundary groundwaters, which is 
particularly problematic because they arguably are most vulnerable to over-
consumption and depletion.227 The 2008 Draft Articles on the Law on Trans-
boundary Aquifers of the International Law Commission were drafted  to rec-
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tify this flaw.228 Whereas in the 1997 Watercourses Convention the scope of 
regulation covered surface waters not connected to confined transboundary 
groundwaters, the 2008 Draft Articles expanded that scope to protect such 
groundwaters.229 As a result, there is a greater burden on aquifer states to ad-
here to the requirements to protect these aquifers or aquifer systems.230 The 
legislation, however, protects the ecosystem of river basins for the purposes 
of securing fresh water supplies for human consumption.231 This legal devel-
opment is crucial because it reflects an evolving international legal regime 
and the codification of customary international water law.232 
The following Sections on the principles of international water law refer 
to the 2008 Draft Articles. Even though these articles have not yet become a 
convention, the principles arguably are binding on states as custom.233 Dis-
cussion of the principles contained in the 2008 Draft Articles is important to 
the extent that they provide an insight into how customary international water 
law has developed.234 Moreover, an agreement has been formed for one river 
basin based on the 2008 Draft Articles, and it presumably is only a matter of 
time before more follow suit.235 Although valid, these Articles do not address 
the other sets of regulations under international water law. In any case, the 
guiding principles of the 2008 Draft Articles reflect the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention, so duplicate analysis is not required.236 The following Sections 
provide an explanation of the manner in which the principles of the frame-
work conventions operate and complement one another. This should provide 
the reader with a better understanding of the mechanics associated with the 
duty to cooperate contained in the 2008 Draft Articles. 
B. Contours of the Obligation to Cooperate 
The principles of international water law that underline how to manage 
transboundary river basins complement each other, providing a framework 
with which the management practice of transboundary river basins ought to 
comply.237 International water law has evolved in recent times to expand the 
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scope of protection to cover aquifer and aquifer systems so that activities af-
fecting both surface waters and groundwaters may be regulated.238 
A transboundary river basin that flows through several basin states ac-
crues benefits to its users.239 Therefore, the international water-law regime, 
which contains substantive and procedural rules and governs the management 
of transboundary river basins, has origins in the principle of limited sover-
eignty and community of interests.240 The management practice must comply 
with both substantive and procedural rules of international water law.241  
The 2008 Draft Articles do not restrict the scope of use or explicitly pro-
hibit any kind of use or activity when it comes to transboundary aquifers.242 
Any use or activity involving the transboundary aquifer, however, is subject 
to certain conditions or limitations.243 These are expressed as the guiding 
principles of the 2008 Draft Articles.244 Draft Article 4 contains the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilization, which governs use of the aquifer or 
aquifer system.245 Even though this is the predominant guiding principle gov-
erning use, interpretation of Draft Article 4 must take into account the other 
guiding principles of the 2008 Draft Articles.246 These include the principle 
not to cause significant harm (Draft Article 6), the obligation to cooperate 
(Draft Article 7), the obligation to exchange data (Draft Article 8), the obliga-
tion to monitor (Draft Article 13), and the obligation to establish joint-
management mechanisms (Draft Article 14).247 The basis for this approach is 
provided in Article 3.248 Although Article 3 recognizes the sovereign rights of 
aquifer states to their portion of a transboundary aquifer (although they do not 
possess absolute sovereignty over the transboundary aquifer), it also sets out 
the limitations of aquifer states in exercising their sovereign rights over the 
transboundary aquifer to the extent that they do comply with the Draft Arti-
cles.249 The nature of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system requires regu-
lation that goes beyond national borders, and international law has recognized 
this kind of regulation in relation to shared natural resources.250 Instead, regu-
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lation is required to take place through collective management and coopera-
tion.251 In effect, this limits the exercise of sovereignty over transboundary 
aquifers to what is permitted in the Draft Articles.252 Having established that 
aquifer states possess limited sovereignty over transboundary aquifers 
through the requirement of aquifer states to comply with the restrictions and 
obligations contained in the Draft Articles, the basic limitation of the princi-
ple of equitable and reasonable utilization has been drawn.253 It is upon this 
basis that the other conditions and limitations of use are considered.254 
Draft Article 4 stipulates four main conditions on utilization in accord-
ance with the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.255 First, use of 
the transboundary aquifer or aquifer system must be “in a manner that is con-
sistent with the equitable and reasonable accrual of benefits therefrom to the 
aquifer States concerned.”256 Equitable and reasonable utilization is a balanc-
ing exercise that considers the non-exhaustive list of factors stipulated in 
Draft Article 5 (Factors Relevant to the Equitable and Reasonable Utiliza-
tion).257 These factors include the size of the “population dependent on the 
aquifer,” the types of demands (social and economic, for example) of the aq-
uifer states, and the measures needed to form or recharge the aquifer or aqui-
fer system, among others.258 Second, use of the transboundary aquifer or aq-
uifer system depends on sustainable utilization because aquifer states are re-
quired to consider the long-term benefits of the utilization.259 Third, use of the 
transboundary aquifer or aquifer system depends on the environmental costs 
to the aquifer where states are required to refrain from utilization while the 
aquifer is recharging or in a way that would stop it from functioning effec-
tively.260 This paragraph pays particular attention to the special characteristics 
of aquifers—notably their vulnerability to overexploitation and inability to 
replenish if the recharge is not sufficient.261 Therefore, equitable utilization 
not only needs to be sensitive to sustainability of the aquifer but also to the 
natural course of recharge and replenishment of the aquifer system.262 Finally, 
use of the transboundary aquifer or aquifer system depends on the establish-
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ment of individual or joint-utilization plans, which encourage the planning of 
an aquifer state’s needs from the aquifer.263 
Collectively, these paragraphs encourage careful planning and monitor-
ing of aquifer states’ use of aquifers. These tie in with the obligation to coop-
erate (Draft Article 7), the obligation to exchange data (Draft Article 8), the 
obligation to monitor (Draft Article 13), and the obligation to establish joint-
management mechanisms (Draft Article 14).264 This pre-planning and moni-
toring approach also dovetails nicely with the precautionary approach rec-
ommended in Draft Article 12 to “prevent, reduce and control pollution” 
where it may cause significant harm.265 More fundamentally, these articles 
and the practice they encourage comport nicely with Draft Article 6, which 
contains the notion that significant harm cannot be caused.266 The principle 
not to cause significant harm does not only complement preventative ac-
tion—namely, the preventing or controlling of pollution—but also supports 
positive action such as maintaining the quantity and quality of water as well 
as appropriate discharge zones to ensure sufficient preservation and protec-
tion of the transboundary aquifer ecosystem (Draft Article 10).267 Draft Arti-
cle 11 regulates the recharge and discharge zones that require special 
measures to ensure that the demarcated recharge and discharge zones are 
maintained and protected to maintain the proper functioning of the aquifer.268 
Such measures may include restricting agricultural or industrial activities that 
would affect water quantity or flow, thereby affecting the overall recharge or 
discharge process of the aquifer.269 
C. Obstacles to Greater Cooperation 
There are advantages to an “integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) and a basin-wide approach to river management,” which is based on 
the idea that water utilization ought to bring economic benefits to people 
without losing “social Equity and Environmental sustainability.”270 This is 
already reflected in the international water-law regime discussed above by 
way of the 1997 Watercourses Convention and the 2008 Draft Articles.271 
With respect to the management of transboundary water resources, the obsta-
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cles to greater cooperation between the Chinese government and its riparian 
neighbors include an emphasis on absolute territorial sovereignty, and the 
preference for bilateralism over multilateralism. 272 The following Sections 
address each obstacle in turn. 
1. Disputed Territory 
China remains in dispute with a number of states over territorial sover-
eignty. For example, India and China dispute around 83,000 square kilome-
ters of territory within the Ganges-Brahmaputra river basin and 25,900 square 
kilometers in the Indus River Basin.273 China and India have yet to settle their 
disputes with respect to areas in the Indus, Brahmaputra, and Ganges river 
basins.274 Unsettled territorial claims mean that the disputed area may not be 
protected by a legal regime on water-resource management.275 Since water-
resource management requires coordination of uses and cooperation, both 
coordination and cooperation would be less forthcoming if two states had a 
territorial dispute. For example, water resources would not be monitored for 
water quality and quantity. Individually, India and China have each shown a 
willingness—even eagerness—to improve the quality of water in their own 
rivers, lakes, and canals by instituting water-improvement programs within 
their respective legal frameworks, the Water Law of China and India’s Envi-
ronmental Protection Act.276 The disputed areas would benefit from these 
management initiatives, but instead these disputes hinder both states from 
cooperating in trying to manage their common water resources. 
2. Territorial Sovereignty and Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
This Section emphasizes how China is an upstream state and so it ought 
to act responsibly with these natural resources. In other words, if China uses 
unilateralism when choosing to do whatever it wants, simply because it is an 
upstream state, this mentality presumably will act as an obstacle to greater 
cooperation with its neighbors. 
China voted against the 1997 Watercourses Convention, claiming that 
the convention affects its territorial sovereignty and sovereignty over natural 
resources.277 As the 1997 Watercourses Convention is an opportunity for Chi-
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na to engage and cooperate with its regional neighbors on shared water-
resource management, China’s refusal to commit to the convention is seen as 
China acting as an upstream hegemon with little or no regard for its riparian 
neighbors.278 Unilateralism runs contrary to the manner in which transbound-
ary water resources ought to be managed, recognizing the principle of “sover-
eign equality” of states. 279 The management of shared water resources is 
based on the principles of limited sovereignty and community of interests.280 
The international water-law regime may enable China to better protect its 
rights and interests in a shared water resource at the international level.281 
The 1997 Watercourses Convention—even though it is an international 
legal instrument that governs the management of international watercours-
es—has had a significant influence on domestic regimes.282 For example, in-
ternational water law recognizes that activities applying the principle of equi-
table and reasonable utilization are restricted to the extent that the principle 
not to cause significant harm is complied with; the interaction between these 
principles has even found its way into U.S. domestic water law.283 For exam-
ple, such principles are considered together in deciding whether water utiliza-
tion is reasonable or to determine the manner in which water-utilization activ-
ities ought to be reasonably apportioned.284 The case of U.S. domestic water 
law may be an example of an upstream riparian state engaging with the inter-
national water regime through its domestic law.285 
3. Bilateralism over Multilateralism 
Allocation of shared water resources is based on economic considera-
tions as well as political bargaining power.286 In the case of the Mekong River 
Basin, China—as an upstream state—enjoys “greater political and hydrologi-
cal power” as compared with its downstream riparian neighbors.287 Hence, 
China’s upstream position makes it more interested in engaging at the bilat-
eral level and less motivated to engage at a multilateral level so that it may 
maintain its influence.288 The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
have discussed China’s joining the management of the Mekong River Basin 
                                                                                                                           
 278 See Nickum, supra note 2, at 230. 
 279 2008 Draft Articles, supra note 25, art. 7; see Weiss, supra note 11, at 194. 
 280 See Weiss, supra note 11, at 194. 
 281 See id. at 206. 
 282 See id. 
 283 See id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 See id. 
 286 See Harold Houba et al., Saving a River: A Joint Management Approach to the Mekong 
River Basin, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 93, 94 (2012). 
 287 Id. 
 288 See id. 
2016] China’s Management of Its International Rivers 263 
for decades, but such efforts have not succeeded.289 China, in the case of the 
management of the Mekong River Basin, prefers to engage as a partner to the 
Mekong River Commission.290 As a partner, China regularly exchanges data 
on water quality and quantity levels.291 It has been suggested that this is not 
sufficient because without China’s being part of the Mekong River Commis-
sion and subjecting its activity decisions to the regime’s regulations, effective 
governance of the entire river basin is obstructed.292 In turn, this may affect 
the preservation and the sustainability of the shared water resources in which 
China ought to be interested.293 Notwithstanding the Mekong example, China 
has shown good cooperation with a riparian neighbor by way of the Agree-
ment between Kazakhstan and China on Water Quality signed in February 
2011 to establish cooperation to protect all transboundary rivers the two states 
share against water pollution.294 This bilateral agreement is listed as a good 
lesson by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and Interna-
tional Network of Basin Organizations, inasmuch as the two states agreed to 
conduct further research on water quality and pollution prevention, as well as 
exchange relevant information.295 The states also agreed to establish a joint 
commission and joint working groups to implement the treaty.296     
 To date, China has only three transboundary water treaties that specifi-
cally focus on non-navigational uses of shared water resources with its neigh-
bors.297 They are with Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia.298 Notwithstanding 
such agreements, China has border treaties with 12 of its 14 riparian neigh-
bors,299 in which there are provisions for the utilization and protection of 
shared water resources.300 It is hoped that China’s policy direction towards 
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environmental protection of its water resources may influence the adoption of 
more protection initiatives such as those with Kazakhstan.  
Multilateralism, on the other hand, encourages compliance with interna-
tional and regional laws and regulations.301 As discussed above, the evolution 
of international water law has ensured that the “utilization, protection, . . . 
preservation” and sustainable development of transboundary water resources 
are addressed.302 Therefore, the legal regime provides useful guidance for the 
management of water resources that would incorporate all these aspects of 
governance.303 A management approach that complies with the international 
water-law regime would help individual states in the conclusion of basin-
level agreements and the establishment of river-basin authorities to manage 
effectively the entire basin they share through joint-management mechanisms 
and cooperation.304 China has signed and ratified many of the major interna-
tional environment treaties, showing that it can engage multilaterally.305 Its 
current domestic policy favors environmental concerns with respect to the 
utilization of its water resources, which can be seen in the various suspen-
sions of dam construction projects that do not comply with environmental 
regulations.306 The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan will address climate change and 
the development of green technologies.307 China shows every sign of being 
aware of the negative environmental impact on its water resources from the 
lack of effective water governance.308 China’s commitment to improving wa-
ter governance through domestic law and policy may encourage it to cooper-
ate further with its neighbors on transboundary water resources.309 Practices 
such as China’s participation in a climate change adaption pilot project may 
encourage multilateralism. Such a pilot project was supported by the UN 
Economic Commission of Europe to protect the Dauria International Protect-
ed Area on the Amur/Argun/Daursky Biosphere Reserve, which is shared by 
Russia, Mongolia, and China.310 China cooperated with Mongolia and Russia 
to create this protected zone in order to conserve the wetland and to imple-
ment measures that would ensure environmental flow and quality of water.311 
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Such efforts resulted in an area of 700,000 hectares of wetland being protect-
ed and a reduction in vulnerability to climate change.312 Such examples of 
multilateral success should not be forgotten. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of China’s rapid depletion of freshwater resources and the grow-
ing pressure of an expanding population and further urbanization, China 
needs to pay particular attention to effective management of this limited re-
source. The features of China’s water-supply system and the challenges that it 
faces mean that reforms will need to address or avoid the causes underlying 
water scarcity. Given the challenges facing China’s water resources, interna-
tional cooperation is essential to effective water-resource management. In-
deed, China does not own other states’ water resources. The best way to man-
age shared water resources is through cooperation, and cooperation does not 
necessarily mean China will have fewer water resources. China should re-
member these points when figuring out how to proceed in the future. China 
has participated in international fora with respect to water management, and it 
has reflected the principles of the 1997 Watercourses Convention in its do-
mestic legal and policy framework for water management. More active en-
gagement within the international legal framework would provide the best 
means for achieving the goal of reducing water scarcity. 
However, there remain significant obstacles to greater cooperation, and 
further reforms are needed in order to increase China’s degree of cooperation. 
Reforms may focus on the following three areas. First, legal and policy 
frameworks can be used to address some of the challenges to China’s water 
security on the demand side. For example, domestic coal-fired power plants 
make huge demands on water resources. A focus on alternative energy 
sources—encouraged with appropriate legal and policy incentives and a sup-
portive regulatory framework—would reduce this particular source of de-
mand for limited water resources. 
Second, China should focus on building stronger water-management in-
stitutions. China’s Water Law of 2002 already provides for river-basin organ-
izations. However, the process for establishing such institutions remains un-
clear. The central government retains a primary planning role, while 
knowledge of local water needs and constraints lie at the local level. There-
fore, further cooperation at the domestic level within an institutional frame-
work  within China would enable stronger governance of water resources.  
Finally, China should engage to a greater degree with neighboring ripar-
ian states—both to ensure adequate water-resource management and to avoid 
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the risk of disputes arising, particularly as water withdrawals grow. China 
clearly has shown its capability to cooperate on the international level with 
effective outcomes. A clear example is the Agreement between Kazakhstan 
and China on Water Quality signed in February 2011 to establish cooperation 
to protect from water pollution all the transboundary rivers the two states 
share. International participation also can inform the development of domes-
tic law and policy: the mechanisms for managing competing interests for lim-
ited water resources are similar whether between states, between provinces, 
or between other regions within a state. The international legal framework for 
joint-management mechanisms provides a helpful framework for this pur-
pose, and China would be wise to increase its reliance on this framework. 
